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WHEN IS A CRIMINAL TRIAL
NOT A CRIMINAL TRIAL?-THE
CASE AGAINST JURY TRIALS
IN JUVENILE COURTl
In May 1968, a juvenile delinquency petition charged appellant
Joseph McKeiver, then 16 years of age, with robbery, larceny and receiv-
ing stolen goods.1 At the time of the hearing McKeiver was represented
by counsel 2 and requested a trial by jury. The request was denied, and
upon the findings made by the Juvenile Court of Philadelphia that he
had violated a law of the Commonwealth, McKeiver was adjudicated a
juvenile delinquent.3 On appeal the Superior Court affirmed without
opinion. 4 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted leave to appeal,
and affirmed the lower court holdings that juveniles did not have a
constitutional right to a jury trial in proceedings in which they were
* This article is a student work prepared by Ronald G. Russo, a member of ST.
JOHN'S LAW REVIEW and St. Thomas More Institute for Legal Research.
1 These offenses are felonies under Pennsylvania law. Pa. STAT. ANN tit. 18,
§§ 4704, 4807, 4817 (1963).
2 At the hearing, McKiever's counsel stated that he had never seen McKeiver
before and was in the midst of his first interview with him (despite the fact
that counsel's office had been appointed five months earlier). Counsel was allowed
five minutes for the interview.
3 The evidence at the hearing seemed rather weak and contradictory. The Common-
wealth's evidence consisted mainly of the testimony of two of the three alleged
victims who were robbed by a group of twenty to thirty youths. After being robbed
the boys were taken to a park guard station by a passing motorist. After several
minutes of preliminary questioning the boys were placed in a patrol car which
cruised the area for a few short minutes when the victims spotted someone they
thought was the boy who robbed them-the boy was Joseph McKeiver.
One boy described the robbery as a gang effort while the other testified that
the thief acted alone. Both victims stated that the robber did not wear glasses,
McKeiver has worn glasses since childhood. One who also testified that the
robber gave his bicycle away also said that the robber rode a bicycle away from
the robbery. The victims said that the robber rode a bicycle throughout the event,
yet one stated he identified McKeiver by his characteristic walk.
4 In re McKeiver, 215 Pa. Super. 760. 255 A.2d 921 (1969).
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adjudicated delinquents upon findings that
they had violated a law of the Common-
wealth.5 On appeal the United States Su-
preme Court was faced with the narrow
issue whether the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment assures the right to
trial by jury in the adjudicative phase of a
state juvenile court delinquency proceeding.
By answering this question in the negative
the Court upheld the rulings of the lower
courts and seemingly ended, at least for
the present, the recent trend toward further
expansion of juvenile rights. 6
Development of the Issue
The issue presented by McKeiver and its
companion cases has been very much in the
public eye in recent years as one aspect of
the overall problem of youth crime and
juvenile justice. So significant were the facts
concerning crime among this country's
youngsters that the President's Commission
stated that "America's best hope for re-
ducing crime is to reduce juvenile delin.-
quency and youth crime." Despite the fact
5 In re McKeiver, 438 Pa. 339, 265 A.2d 350
(1970).
6 403 U.S. 528 (1971). It is necessary to note
that in this decision the Supreme Court disposed
of McKeiver as well as two other appeals. In re
Terry 215 Pa. Super. 760, 255 A.2d 921 (1969)
had been consolidated with McKiever by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. In re Burrus 275
N.C. 517, 169 S.E.2d 879 (1969), was a case on
writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of North
Carolina. For the purposes of this paper it will
suffice that the reader be aware that all three
cases presented the identical issue; i.e., whether
the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment assures the right to trial by jury in the
adjudicative phase of a state juvenile deliquency
proceeding.
7 THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW EN-
that the problem is receiving such great
attention from the courts, it is by no means
a new problem. The history of juvenile
justice is a history of paradoxes and dilem-
mas. s Society has generally been torn be-
tween treating youthful offenders either as
wayward children who must be rehabilitated
or as criminals who must be punished.
Early English criminal law established a
rebuttable presumption that any offender
over the age of seven but under the age of
fourteen was incapable of distinguishing
between right and wrong. Any offender over
fourteen was treated as an adult. 9 This prac-
FORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUS-
TICE: THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE
SOCIETY 55 (1967) [hereinafter CRIME IN A FREE
SOCIETY]. It is difficult to draw a clear picture
of the scope of juvenile delinquency on a na-
tional level. The statistics drawn by Crime in a
Free Society etch the rough outline of the grow-
ing problem. The group of children ranging in
age from 11 to 17 years old while representing
13.2% of the population are responsible for
hall the arrests for serious property crimes such
as burglary, larceny and motor vehicle theft.
The arrest rate for these crimes is higher for
the 15 tol7-year-old group than it is for any
other age group in society.
It should also be observed that the trend is not
indicative of a decrease. On the contrary, in the
five years between 1960 and 1965, arrests of
persons under 18 years of age was up 52% for
such violent crimes as willful homicide, rape,
robbery, aggravated assault, larceny and bur-
glary. The increment in arrests for the entire
population over 18 was less than half that at
20%. For a further consideration of the para-
mount importance of this problem see also Paul-
sen, Kent v. United States: The Constitutional
Context of Juvenile Cases, 1966 Sup. CT. REV.
167 [hereinafter The Constitjional Context].
8 See generally Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform:
An Historical Perspectitve, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187
(1970).
9 W. CLARK & W. MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF CRIMES 125 (5th ed. 1952).
tice was carried to the United States. The
juvenile was entitled to the same constitu-
tional protections assured to his elders,
but he was traumatized by the criminal
hearing and subsequent incarceration with
murderers, rapists and thieves. Such a
system of justice (if we can apply the
word to such proceedings) was far from
rehabilitating.
In 1899 the first Juvenile Court Statutel'
was adopted in Illinois: it was the incar-
nation of the philosophy of juvenile jus-
tice." Under this system the goal was
not punishment of the child but "what
had best be done in his interest and the in-
terest of the state to save him from a down-
ward career."'1 2 The juvenile was to be
treated at an informal adjudication rather
than in a criminal prosecution. 13 As a re-
10 Act of April 21, 1899, 111. Laws 131.
11 The juvenile court system seems quite com-
monplace in today's legal structure. However at
its inception one author called this system "a
revolution in the attitude of the state toward its
offending children .... ." Mack, The Juvenile
Court, 23 HARv. L. REV. 104 (1909).
12 Id. at 119-120.
13 Judge Mack describes such informal hearings
and their benefits:
The child who must be brought into court
should, of course, be made to know that he is
face to face with the power of the state, but
he should at the same time and more emphat-
ically, be made to feel that he is the object
of its care and solicitude. The ordinary trap-
pings of the courtroom are out of place in
such hearings. The judge on a bench looking
down upon the boy standing at the bar can
never evoke a proper sympathetic spirit. Seated
at a desk with the child at his side where he
can on occasion put his arm around his shoul-
der and draw the lad to him, the judge while
losing none of his judicial dignity, will gain
immensely the effectiveness of his work.
Id. at 120.
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sult the rigid procedural requirements were
discarded and the concept of parens patriae
was adopted. Such "civil" procedure 14 was
not subject to the requirements which
placed restrictions on the state when it seeks
to deprive a person of his freedom.' 5
Although it is true that "for over sixty-
five years the Supreme Court gave no con-
sideration at all to the constitutional prob-
lems involved in the juvenile court area,"16
problems did exist. The situation was be-
coming so blatantly unjust that Dean Pound
was prompted to say, in 1937, that "the
powers of the Star Chamber were a trifle in
comparison with those of our juvenile
courts."'1 7 Slowly it was becoming clear that
unlimited discretion on the part of juvenile
courts could lead to the unjustifiable and
arbitrary usurpation of due process of law
in the name of juvenile justice. Perhaps the
earliest observation of this was made for the
Court by Mr. Justice Douglas in 1948,
when he stated that "neither man or child
can be allowed to stand condemned by
14 Judge Prettyman in Appendix A to his opin-
ion in Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556, 561
(D.C. Cir. 1959) lists authorities from 51 juris-
dictions showing that proceedings in juvenile
courts are not criminal cases.
15 The deprivation of these rights was not with-
out its constitutional ramifications. Nevertheless,
its constitutionality has been sustained in most
instances. See generally The Constitutional Con-
text; see also Waite, How Far Can Court Proce-
dure be Socialized Without Impairing Individual
Rights, 12 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 339 (1922).
16 438 Pa. at 341, 265 A.2d at 352.
17 Foreward to YOUNG, SOCIAL TREATMENT IN
PROBATION AND DELINQUENCY xxvii (1937). For
a more detailed discussion of the constitutional
issues involved prior to the court's enunciation
of expanded juvenile rights, see generally
Antieau, Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Courts,
46 CORNELL L.Q. 387 (1961).
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methods which flout constitutional require-
ments of due process of law.' 8 While at this
early stage there was no explicit inclination
toward treating juveniles with the same due
process guarantees enjoyed by their elders,
nevertheless the idea of due process require-
ments was present, albeit embryonic in
form. Perhaps social consciousness was not
as acute; perhaps the failings of the juvenile
courts were not as blatant; perhaps those
who led the movement felt that the still
young juvenile court needed time to prove
itself. For whatever reason, the Supreme
Court convened and adjourned more than
ten times before a significant decision con-
cerning deprivation of basic due process at
juvenile hearings was handed down. Even
in 1962 the decision of the Court in Gal-
legos v. Colorado19 was a weak echo of
what was stated in Haley. To be sure no
new ground was broken in Gallegos. How-
ever, the threshold proposition, that due
process of law may not be disregarded in a
criminal prosecution despite the fact that
the defendant is a minor, was reaffirmed.
The Recent Approach
The first reaction of the Supreme Court
to the complete discretion enjoyed by the
18 Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 601 (1948).
Haley did not specifically involve the issue of a
juvenile being adjudicated at a hearing but
rather of a 15-year-old who was tried for mur-
der and convicted in a state criminal prosecution.
The basic issue was whether a confession ob-
tained from the appellant was admissible. The
Court said it was inadmissible not because appel-
lant was a juvenile but because anyone tried in
a criminal prosecution is entitled to basic due
process.
19 370 U.S. 49 (1962). Gallegos was 14 years
old. All other facts are similar to those in Haley.
juvenile court, unfettered by due process
requirements, did not come until very re-
cently. The reaction was registered in Kent
v. United States.20 While still not directly
on the mark of rights of juveniles in juve-
nile court, the Court did move perceptibly
further in Kent than it had previously gone.
Kent stood for the proposition that a juve-
nile court, before entering an order waiving
its exclusive jurisdiction and authorizing a
minor to be prosecuted in a regular criminal
proceeding, must employ procedural regu-
larity sufficient in each case "to satisfy the
basic requirements of due process and
fairness. . . . [T]here is no place in our
system of law for reaching a result of such
tremendous consequences without cere-
mony."21
Law does not develop in a vacuum. To
the layman Kent might have appeared to
be a relatively unimportant decision in the
movement toward the expansion of juvenile
rights. However, seasoned observers of the
Court could discern the philosophical un-
derpinnings which supported the opinion
in Kent. -2 Indeed, Mr. Justice Fortas, writ-
ing for the majority in Kent, went beyond
20 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
21 Id. at 553-554. The Court conceded the fact
that the Juvenile Court had great discretion in
determining whether it should retain jurisdiction
over a child or should waive such jurisdiction.
Yet such discretion is not absolute and the Juve-
nile Court may not consider the "critically im-
portant" question of whether a child shall be
deprived of the special protection of the Juvenile
Court Act, D.C. CODE § 16-2308 (Supp. III,
1964), without a full investigation of the facts.
22 In his article, Professor Paulsen puts the im-
pact of Kent into perspective:
Though the Court's opinion in Kent does not
actually hurl constitutional thunderbolts at
the nation's juvenile courts and police prac-
the narrow issue of waiver of jurisdiction
and expressed the broader fear that
there may be grounds for concern that the
child receives the worst of both worlds: that
he gets neither the protections accorded to
adults nor the solicitous care and regenera-
tive treatment postulated for children.23
And so it was that in 1966 the effect of
Kent combined with the previous dearth
of decisions from the Court and the undeni-
able weight of the evidence, 24 attesting to
the scope of the problem of juvenile of-
fenders on a national level. These forces
could all be seen to accentuate the broken
dreams so handsomely embodied in the
juvenile court movement at the turn of
the century and to expose the failure of the
Supreme Court to pass definitively on the
question of constitutional guarantees in ju-
venile hearings. In 1967 the Court handed
down its landmark decision in the area of
juvenile justice-In re Gault.25
Seen from a jurisprudential angle, Gault
tices respecting juveniles, it does raise a warn-
ing of turbulent weather ahead.
The Constitutional Context at 183.
23 383 U.S. at 556.
24 See note 7 supra.
25 387 U.S. 1 (1967). For a broader discussion
of this significant decision see generally Dorsen
& Rezneck, Gault and the Future of Juvenile
Law, 1 FAMILYL. Q. 1 (1967) [thereinafter Dorsen
& Rezneck]; Ketcham, Guidelines from Gault:
Revolutionary Requirements and Reappraisal, 53
VA. L. REV. 1700 (1967); Lefstein, In re Gault,
Juvenile Courts and Lawyers, 53 A.B.A.J. 811
(1967); Miller, The Dilemma of the Post Gault
Juvenile Court, 3 FAMILY L.J. 229 (1969);
Polier, The Gault Case: Its Practical Impact on
the Philosophy and Objectives of the Juvenile
Court, I FAMILY L.Q. 47 (1967); Note, 14 How.
L.J. 150 (1968); Note, 8 J. FAMILY L. 416
(1968).
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was merely the logical progression of the
ideas expressed in Kent. While Kent stated
that the juvenile court judge's exercise of
the power of the state as parens patriae
was not unlimited, Gault more candidly
stated that "under our Constitution, the
condition of being a boy does not justify a
kangaroo court.126 Gault, then age 15, was
charged with "Lewd Phone Calls" in the
referral report. He was taken into custody
without notice to his parents. His mother,
after visiting the detention home where
Gerald was confined, was orally advised
of the charge against her son and that he
would have a hearing the following after-
noon. On the hearing day a petition was
filed making no reference to the reasons for
the legal action. The petition was not shown
to the boy. At the hearing no one was sworn
and the complainant was not present. The
arresting officer attested that the boy's con-
fession was made in the absence of his par-
ents, without an attorney and without being
advised of his rights. Following this hearing
Gerald Gault was confined to the Arizona
State Industrial School for the period of
his minority (6 years) unless sooner dis-
charged by due process of law.27 The facts
in this case realized the fears expressed by
Justice Fortas in Kent.2s Juveniles such as
Gault were being deprived of their con-
stitutional rights under the guise of solici-
tous care. In re Gault held that while the
essentials of due process to which a juvenile
261 387 U.S. at 28.
27 This offense, if committed by an adult is
"punishable by a fine of not less than five nor
more than fifty dollars, or by imprisonment in
the county jail for not more than two months."
ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-377 (1956).
28 383 U.S. at 556.
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is entitled are not commensurate with all the
rights and privileges to which an adult is
entitled, nevertheless, certain fundamental
guarantees must be met. While not defining
what such guarantees are, the Court did
assure to juveniles the following basic
rights: adequate notice of the charges, the
rights to counsel, confrontation and cross-
examination and the privilege against self-
incrimination.2 9 Disdaining even the grant
of these limited rights, Mr. Justice Stewart
strongly dissented from the majority. Es-
pousing the philosophy of the early juvenile
justice reformers, he felt these rights were
both unnecessary burdens to the juvenile
court system as well as a step backward
toward making juvenile proceedings re-
semble criminal trials, the very situation
which motivated the reformers to establish
a juvenile court almost one hundred years
ago.30 The Court, however, left many con-
spicuous questions unanswered, obviously
intending to have them answered on a
case-by-case basis. 31 In 1970 a New York
case, In re Winship,3 2 gave the Court an
opportunity to further its expansion of
rights guaranteed to juveniles.
The Court held that a New York
29 The Court expressly limited itself to the issues
presented and indicated no opinion as to whether
the decision of that (Arizona Supreme) court
with respect to such other issues (viz. the right
to a transcript of the proceedings and the right
to appellate review) does or does not conflict
with the requirements of the Federal Constitu-
tion.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 11 (1966).
30 Id. at 78. (Stewart, J., dissenting). This con-
cept did become the majority opinion in Mc-
Kiever.
31 See generally Dorsen & Rezneck, supra note
25.
32 397 U.S. 358 (1970)
statute,33 which required any determination
at the conclusion of an adjudicatory hearing
to be based on a preponderance of the
evidence rather than on the reasonable-
doubt standard, was unconstitutional.3 4 The
opinion concluded that the reasonable-
doubt standard of proof was as much a
matter of due process as were the consti-
tutional safeguards applied in Gault. With
this decision the reasonable-doubt standard
became another of the essentials of due
process and fair treatment which Gault
required be met.35 With no concrete defini-
tion as to what constitutes an essential
element of due process, "court-watching"
became an avocation of some attorneys who
were awaiting decisions on such questions
33 N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 755(b) (McKinney
1963).
34 While the line between the "preponderance
of the evidence" standard and the "reasonable
doubt" standard may seem to be indistinguish-
able, it is still noteworthy that the New York
Family Court Judge made the distinction quite
clearly.
[Hie explicitly acknowledged that he was bas-
ing his findings of fact on the 'preponderance
of the evidence' and frankly admitted that the
proof fell short of establishing guilt or delin-
quency beyond a reasonable doubt.
24 N.Y.2d 196, 206, 247 N.E.2d 253, 260, 299
N.Y.S.2d 414, 423 (1969) (Fuld, Ch. J., dis-
senting).
35 The ideas enunciated in the dissenting opinion
of Stewart in Gault were repeated, in the dissent
of the newly appointed Chief Justice, to the
Winship majority. Inter alia, Chief Justice Bur-
ger said
I dissent from further stait-jacketing of an
already overly restricted system. What the
juvenile court system needs is not more but
less of the trappings of legal procedure and
judicial formalism; the juvenile court system
requires breathing room and flexibility in or-
der to survive, if it can survive the repeated
assaults from this Court.
397 U.S. at 376 (.Vr~er, Ch.. J., dissenting).
as whether there is a right to appeal from
an adjudication of deliquency, whether
there is a right to have a transcript or other
record kept of the proceeding, whether the
juvenile court judge must state the grounds
for his findings when he is the trier of fact,
whether juveniles are entitled to invoke the
constitutional guarantee against unreason-
able searches and seizures or whether juve-
niles are entitled to trial by jury.36 Which
of these rights are essential elements of due
process and therefore required by Gault?
Which are non-essential legal formalism
and, therefore, at odds with the juvenile
court philosophy? McKeiver v. Pennsyl-
vania resolved the issue as to trial by jury
for juveniles. It seems that the other issues
will be resolved in due course.
The Instant Case
To be sure, the precise issue-whether
juveniles are constitutionally entitled to
trial by jury in the adjudicative phase of a
state juvenile court deliquency proceeding
-had been presented to lower courts many
times. The majority of these cases seem to
have answered the question in the nega-
tive.37 With the McKeiver appeal the issue
36 See generally Dorsen & Rezneck, supra note
25.
37 The cases which have held that there is no
constitutional right to trial by jury for juveniles
are: In re Fucini, 44 Ii. 2d 305, 255 N.E.2d 380
(1970); In re D., 27 N.Y.2d 90, 261 N.E.2d 627,
313 N.Y.S.2d 704 (1970); In re Johnson, 254
Md. 517, 255 A.2d 419 (1969); Hopkins v.
Youth Court, 227 So. 2d 282 (Miss. Sup. Ct.
1969); In re Geiger, 184 Neb. 581, 169 N.W.2d
431 (1969); In re J.W., 106 N.J. Super. 129,
254 A.2d 334 (Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1969); In
re Alger, 19 Ohio St. 2d 70, 249 N.E.2d 808
(1969); State v. Turner, 253 Ore. 235, 453 P.2d
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was finally presented for resolution.
Grounding the opinion on many different
bases, Mr. Justice Blackmun, writing for
the majority, concluded that trial by jury
is not constitutionally guaranteed to juve-
niles.
A proper understanding of the very na-
ture of the right to trial by jury is essential
to a complete appreciation of the McKeiver
decision.38 The right to jury trial is em-
bodied in the United States Constitution. 9
The nature of this constitutional guarantee
is a matter of historical development
through a long line of judicial decisions.
Recently, in the companion cases of Dun-
can v. Louisiana0 and Bloom v. Illinois,41
a "skeletal history" was traced which gave
"impressive support for considering the
right to jury trial in criminal cases to be
fundamental to our system of justice, an
importance frequently recognized in the
opinions of this Court. '42 Duncan was basi-
910 (1969); Dryden v. Commonwealth, 435
S.W.2d 457 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968); Estes v. Hopp,
73 Wash. 2d 263, 438 P.2d 205 (1968); Com-
monwealth v. Johnson, 211 Pa. Super. 62, 234
A.2d 9 (1967). Contra, Nieves v. United States,
280 F. Supp. 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Peyton v.
Nord, 78 N.M. 717, 437 P.2d 716 (1968);
Saunders v. Lupiano, 30 App. Div. 2d 803, 292
N.Y.S.2d 44 (Ist Dep't 1968).
38 For an in depth discussion of the area of
jury trials, see generally Comment, Jury Trials
in Criminal Prosecution: "Freedom Lives", 45
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 304 (1970).
" U.S. CoNsr. amend. VI states that "[iun all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial by an im-
partial jury of the state and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed."
40 391 U.S. at 145 (1968).
41 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
42 391 U.S. at 153-154. Duncan cited numerous
decisions supporting the importance of the right
to trial by jury.
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cally concerned with a provision of the
constitution of Louisiana which authorized
a trial by jury only in cases in which con-
viction may result in hard labor or capital
punishment. 43 The Court stated, inter alia,
that
[Blecause we believe that trial by jury in
criminal cases is fundamental to the Ameri-
can scheme of justice, we hold that the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right
of jury trial in all criminal cases which
-were they to be tried in a federal court
-would come within the Sixth Amend-
ment's guarantee. 44
Since Duncan would have been guaranteed
a trial by jury if tried in a federal court,
the Supreme Court reversed the Louisiana
court's conviction. A cursory reading of the
decision will indicate the thinking of the
Court as to the overriding importance of
trial by jury. Quoting from various de-
cisions, the Court illustrated that the right
to trial by jury was among those "funda-
mental principles of liberty and justice
which lie at the base of all our civil and
political institutions,"' '45 and is "basic in
our system of jurisprudence" 46 and "is a
fundamental right, essential to a fair
trial,"' 47 any crime which might result in
43 Appellant Duncan was tried on a charge of
simple battery which is a misdemeanor and is
punishable by a fine of not more than $300 or
imprisonment for not more than two years, or
both. Appellant was convicted and sentenced to
serve 60 days in prison and to pay a fine of $150.
44 391 U.S. at 149.
45 391 U.S. at 148, quoting Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932).
46 Id., quoting It re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273
(1948).
47 Id., quoting Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335, 343-44 (1963).
a two-year incarceration was therefore a
"serious crime. ' ' 48
In the case of Bloom v. Illinois the ques-
tion of trial by jury in criminal contempt
proceedings was at issue. The court again
asserted the basic role played by the jury
trial in criminal prosecutions. Indeed, the
Court suggested that a stronger argument
for the necessity of jury trial can be made
where a defendant should be protected
"against the arbitrary exercise of official
power. Contemptuous conduct, though a
public wrong, often strikes at the most
vulnerable and human qualities of a judge's
temperament. ' 49 The paramount impor-
tance of the jury trial is therefore clearly
expressed in both Duncan and Bloom.5 °
In light of the preeminence given to the
jury trial as a constitutional bulwark against
faulty fact-finding, it becomes clear that the
first obstacle which the Court had to over-
come was its own recent decisions. How-
ever, labelling the juvenile proceeding a
civil prosecution 1 obviated the need to
4- Duncan stated that where a conviction could
result in imprisonment of two years the fourth
amendment guarantee is called into action. Only
two years later, in Baldwin v. New York, 399
U.S. 66 (1970), the period of imprisonment
needed to require trial by jury was reduced to
six months.
49 Id. at 202.
50 Due to the fact that DeStephano v. Woods,
392 U.S. 631 (1968), had limited Duncan and
Bloom to prospective application, an earlier ap-
peal, DeBacker v. Brainard, 396 U.S. 28 (1969),
which had presented the juvenile jury trial issue
directly to the Court, was dismissed. In a per
curiam decision, the opinion stated that as to
DeBacker, whose juvenile court hearing took
place prior to May 20, 1968, the date of the
Duncan and Bloot rulings, Duncan and Bloom
were inapplicable.
51 Cf. note 14 supra.
attack the position of importance held by
the right to trial by jury in criminal prose-
cutions. Since the juvenile proceeding has
not been held to be a "criminal prosecu-
tion," there is no automatic application of
the Duncan rule to such cases. The Court
wisely observed, however, that the mere
label of "civil" does not remove criminal
aspects from such proceeding. The question
cannot be solved simply by attaching the
label of "civil" or "criminal" to a juvenile
proceeding. Rather, the threshold question
to be answered was asked in Gault and con-
cerns ascertaining the precise impact of the
due process requirement upon such pro-
ceeding.5 2 "Fundamental fairness"-not the
application of all protections guaranteed to
criminal defendants-was the mandate of
Gault and Winship. What then is the precise
impact of jury trial upon a juvenile pro-
ceeding? McKeiver held that one cannot
say that in our legal system the jury is a
necessary component of fact-finding.53
52 387 U.S. at 14. The Court in McKeiver noted
that while the privilege against self-incrimination
had been imposed upon state criminal trials in
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), there was
no automatic application of such privilege to
juvenile trials through Gault. Rather, Gault
considered the impact of this privilege upon the
juvenile hearing before requiring it. The same
was true of the rights of cross-examination and
confrontation, guaranteed to state prosecutions
by Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) and
Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
Again Gault considered the precise impact of
such due process requirements upon juvenile
hearings.
53 403 U.S. at 543. The Court conceded that
"there is much to be said for it, to be sure, but
we have been content to pursue other ways for
determining facts." Id. The Court cited Duncan
in reasoning that not every criminal trial held
before a judge alone is unfair. The Court also
questioned the utter necessity of a jury for fact-
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Dispensing in this manner with the in-
herent necessity of trial by jury for a fair
determination of facts, McKeiver then con-
sidered the impact of jury trial upon the
juvenile court system. Here the Court dis-
cussed the procedural practicalities rather
than the substantive realities. Mr. Justice
Blackmun discussed at length the philoso-
phy underlying the juvenile court. He
acknowledged its shortcomings and prob-
lems but rejected the pessimism which
threatens the very existence of the system
of juvenile justice. He expressed the fear
that the introduction of juries will
[Riemake the juvenile proceeding into a
fully adversary process and will put an
effective end to what has been the idealistic
prospect of an intimate, informal protective
proceeding. 54
The Court also emphasized the conspicuous
absence of any recommendation of the in-
troduction of jury trial into juvenile pro-
ceedings by the report submitted by the
President's Commission on Law Enforce-
ment and the Administration of Justice.55
While the report had been openly critical
of the dismal failures of the American sys-
finding integrity in view of DeStephano's limiting
Duncan to prospective application, a limitation
which the Court felt would never have been
made were the integrity of the result at issue.
The author feels that the majority in McKeiver
chose to underrate the fundamental position
given to jury trial by Duncan, 403 U.S. at 545.
54 The dilemma is again obvious-give the child
all the constitutional safeguards of an adversary
proceeding or attempt to treat him informally
and suffer the loss of basic rights as has been
the experience of the past.
55 TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
AND YOUTH CRIME (1967) [hereinafter TASK
FORCE REPORT].
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tern of juvenile justice, 0' , it nevertheless
stated that "the ideal of separate treatment
of children is still worth pursuing."57 In
addition, the Court reasoned that the bene-
fits derived from a jury trial would be
negligible when compared with the "tradi-
tional delay, the formality and the clamor
of the adversary system and, possibly, the
public trial"58 which would be the by-
products of jury trials.5 9 As a further
authority, the Court notes that at least
29 states and the District of Columbia deny
juveniles the right to trial by jury by stat-
ute,60 while other states have denied this
right by judicial decision. 61
While the Court expresses great hope in
the self-healing powers of the juvenile
court, it is not naive. It realizes that there
may be but a short time before hopes are
dashed again. "Perhaps that ultimate dis-
illusionment will come one day, but for
the moment we are disinclined to give
impetus to it. ' ' 62 The dissenters feel the dis-
illusionment has arrived already.
50 For an excellent expression of the chasm be-
tween theory and practice in the juvenile justice
system see TASK FORCE REPORT 9.
57 Id.
58 403 U.S. at 550.
59 The Court obviously conceded that were any
state to feel that a jury trial is desirable or even
essential nothing would preclude it from injecting
such a procedure into its juvenile courts.
60 ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 369 (1958); ALASKA
STAT. § 47.10.070 (Supp. 1970); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 8-229 (1956) (repealed Laws
1970), ch. 223, § 1); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-206
(1947); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1175 (Supp.
1969-70); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.02(2) (1961);
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2420 (1970); HAWAII REV.
LAWS § 71-41 (1968); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-
1813 (Supp. 1969); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3215
(Supp. 1957); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.27 (1969);
KY. REV. STAT. § 208.060 (1962); LA. REV.
In an extremely cogent and realistic dis-
sent Justices Black, Douglas6 ' and Marshall
cut their way through the rhetorical smoke
screen and saw the situation as it exists in
all too many states. 64 In McKeiver, Terry
STAT. § 13:1579 (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 260.155 (1) (1971); Miss. CODE ANN. § 7185-
08 (1942); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.171 (6)
(1962) (equity practice controls); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 43-206.03 (2) (1968); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 62.190 (3) (1967); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:4-35
(1952); N.Y. FAMILY COURT ACT §§ 164, 165
(McKinney 1963) and N.Y. Civ. PRAc. § 4101
(McKinney 1963); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-285
(1969); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-16-18 (1960);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 2151.35 (Page 1968);
ORE. REV. STAT. § 419.498 (1) (1968); PA. STAT.
tit. 11, § 247 (1965); CODE OF LAW S.C.
§ 15,1095.19 (Supp. 1970); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 55-10-94 (Supp. 1969); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33
§ 651 (a) (Supp. 1970); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 13.04.030; D.C. CODE ANN. 16-2316 (a) (Supp.
1971).
61 In re Daedler, 194 Cal. 320, 228 P. 467
(1924); Cinque v. Boyd, 99 Conn. 70, 121 Atl.
678 (1823); In re Fletcher, 251 Md. 520, 248
A.2d 364 (1968); Commonwealth v. Page, 339
Mass. 313, 316, 159 N.E.2d 82, 85 (1959); In
re Perham, 104 N.H. 276, 184 A.2d 449 (1962).
While not conclusive, the Court felt the fact
that when a practice is followed by such a num-
ber of states, it is worth considering "in deter-
mining whether the practice 'offends some prin-
ciple of justice so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental.' " 403 U.S. at 548, quoting Snyder
v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
62 403 U.S. at 551.
63 When the issue of jury trials for juveniles
was first presented to the Court in DeBacker,
both Justices Black and Douglas refused to dis-
miss the appeal but considered the appeal on
the merits and filed separate dissenting opinions.
These dissents were, in a very real sense, an
obituary for the juvenile justice system.
64 The facts concerning the staffs of juvenile
courts are nothing short of startling. The num-
ber of juvenile judges as of 1964 was listed as
2,987, of whom 213 are full-time juvenile court
judges. See NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE
and Burrus the issue had been whether they
had violated a state criminal law. "Ad-
judiciation" as a deliquent could mean
"confinement" in a state correctional in-
stitution65 for up to 10 years in one appeal
and for not less than five years in the other
two. Under such circumstances no adult
could be denied trial by jury.66 Indeed, the
dissenters feel that no procedural protection
should be denied juveniles.
Where a state uses its juvenile
[C]ourt proceedings to prosecute a juvenile
COURT JUDGES, DIRECTORY AND MANUAL (1964).
Of these it is reported that
half have no undergraduate degree at all; a
fifth had received no college education at all;
a fifth were not members of the bar. Almost
three-quarters devote less than a quarter of
their time to juvenile and family matters and
judicial hearings turn out to be little more
than attenuated interviews of 10 to 15 minutes
duration. Similarly, more than four-fifths of
the juvenile judges poled in a recent survey
reported no psychologist or psychiatrist avail-
able to them on a regular basis-over half a
century after the juvenile court movement
set out to achieve the coordinated application
of the behavioral and social sciences to the
misbehaving child.
CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 80.
65 Behind the non-offensive words "state correc-
tional institution" may exist factors which led
one Pennsylvania court to refer to one such
institution as "a maximum security prison for
adjudged deliquents." In re Bethea, 215 Pa. Su-
per. 75, 76, 257 A.2d 268, 269 (1969). The
institution being referred to is a brick building
with barred windows, locked steel doors, a cy-
clone fence topped with barbed wire and guard
towers.
60 Duncan held that a defendant who is tried for
a crime which can bring a maximum incarcera-
tion of 2 years is entitled to a trial by jury as a
matter of right. The Court has since reduced the
period of incarceration necessary for a manda-
tory jury trial to 6 months in Baldwin v. New
York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
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for a criminal act and to order "conline-
ment" until the child reaches 21 years of age
or where the child at the threshold of the
proceedings faces that prospect, then he is
entitled to the same procedural protection
as an adult.67
Justice Black repeated many of the argu-
ments he presented in DeBacker.68 The idea
was again expressed that the label "civil
proceeding" was a mere sham when one
considers the possible length of the incar-
ceration, the condition of many correctional
institutions and the lack of secrecy of many
of the proceedings. As a support to these
arguments the dissenters appended a recent
decision from Rhode Island to their dis-
sent. 69 This decision was extremely practi-
cal in its approach and avoided the many
generalities in which the majority in Mc-
Keiver indulged. The appendix stressed the
trauma which a juvenile hearing causes a
minor and asks whether a trial by twelve
objective citizens can cause more trauma
than is caused by being incarcerated by a
judge who sits as a one-man grand jury and
then sits in judgment on his own determina-
tion arising out of the proceedings and facts
he conducted.
As to the fear that the introduction of
jury trials would impair the functioning of
67 403 U.S. at 599 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
6s "I can see no basis whatsoever in the lan-
guage of the Constitution for allowing persons
like appellant the benefit of those rights
[granted in Gault] and yet denying them a
jury trial, a right which is surely one of the
fundamental aspects of criminal justice in the
English-speaking world."
Id., quoting DeBacker v. Brainard, 396 U.S. at
34 (dissenting opinion).
69 In the matter of McCloud, - R.I. - (Family
Ct. Jan. 15, 1971).
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the juvenile justice system, this simply is
not supported by fact.70 Far from impairing
the justice in the juvenile court it is argued
that
[B]y granting the juvenile the right to a
jury trial, we would, in fact, be protecting
the accused from the judge who is under
pressure to move the cases, the judge with
too many cases and not enough time. 71
In addition, the recent decision of Williams
v. Florida,72 which held that the constitu-
tional right to trial by jury may be satisfied
by a jury of less than twelve men, could
facilitate the introduction of juries into
juvenile court. A smaller jury could help
maintain the informality so essential to
Juvenile hearings while providing objec-
tive fact-finders. It is further argued that a
70 The Denver Juvenile Court and the Detroit
Juvenile Court are cited as two examples of
courts where jury trials have been permitted by
statute. In Denver the first seven months of 1970
saw fewer than two dozen requests for jury trials
and Detroit Juvenile Court had less than five
jury trials in the year 1969-1970.
71 403 U.S. at 565 (Appendix to dissent).
72 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
jury cannot render the juvenile hearing
more public than is presently the situation
with "[w]itnesses for the prosecution and
defense, social workers, court reporters,
students, police trainees, probation coun-
sellors and sheriffs present in the court-
room."
73
Finally, the Appendix goes to the heart
of the matter with its consideration of the
label "civil" and "criminal." The inescap-
able conclusion is reached-"Murder is
murder; robbery is robbery-they are both
criminal offenses, not civil, regardless and
independent of the age of the doer. .... -74
The fact that the juvenile court was meant
to rehabilitate children who had become
delinquent does not mean that the juvenile
court has abdicated from the judicial sys-
tem. Indeed, it is difficult to understand why
solicitous, rehabilitative treatment neces-
sarily precludes the sixth amendment guar-
antee of trial by jury. One can only wonder
why treatment as a child and this consti-
tutional protection are mutually exclusive.
73 403 U.S. at 567 (Appendix to dissent).
74 Id. at 571-572 (Appendix to dissent).
